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The question of the participation of the United States in an In-ternational Wheat Agreement is being re-considered. The last session of Congress failed to ratify the Agreement which had been worked out by representatives of 36 nations. These same nations are now in process of negotiating a new Agreement which will be submitted again for ratification by Congress. There is a pos-sibility that the U.S.S.K. and Argentina will become members. It is well to review briefly the elements involved in the proposal which failed to get Congressional approval last year. 
Basically its purpose was to assure supplies of wheat to im-porting countries and markets to exporting countries. For a per-iod of 5 years Canada was to supply 230 million bushels of wheat, Australia 85 million bushels and the United States 185 million bushels per year. 
This amount annually (500 million bushels) was to be sold under guaranteed price floors and ceilings as follows: 
Crop Year Floor Ceiling $ ' $ 
1948-49 1.50 2.00 1949-50 1.40 2.00 1950-51 1.30 2.00 1951-52 1.20 • 2.00 1952-53 1.10 2.00 
These prices were to be for No. 1 Manitoba Northern wheat in store Fort William, Port Arthur, Canada. Adjustments were to be made for transportation costs and exchange rates prevailing for each country. 
The Problem 
Since the end of the war, there has been a world shortage of wheat. World trade was disrupted by the war and the shortage of dollars in importing countries casts a shadow on all attempts to restore it. But even if we could temporarily restore world trade in general, wheat would soon fall into its pre-war difficulties. Ex-porting countries would again be searching frantically for markets. In the words of Secretary of Agriculture Brannan: "We all remem-bered what happened after World War I when some of the nations of Europe, feeling that they had to rely on their own resources, inaugurated a drive toward self-sufficiency in wheat production. That action was costly to the people of Europe in terms of higher prices for their basic food product. It cost the wheat farmers of the United States a sizable part of their foreign market. It was costly to the whole world in that it lead to the construction of trade barriers which were the preamble to World War II.'" 
•"Assistant Agricultural Economist 'Office of the Secretary, U.S.D.A.. Ju ly 9, 1948, 
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Will We Be Trading On a Large Scale? 
The relative position of the United States as a grain exporter changed in the past few years. During the years 1934-38 this coun-try accounted for about 6.5 percent of the total world exports of bread grains, practically entirely of wheat. Canada held the major part of the world market at that time (32 percent) with Argentina 
Wheat Production and Domestic. Consumption, United States, 1909-481 
(Millions of Bushels) 
Total Production 
fear New Domestic Above Domestic Crop Disappearance3 Use 
1909 684 538 146 • 88 1910 625 537 1911 618 552 66 1912 730 568 162 1913 . 751 612 139 1914 . 897 607 290 1915 .. 1,009 609 400 1916 . 635 596 39 1917 . 620 555 65 1918 . 904 580 324 1919 . 952 647 305 1920 . 843 574 269 1921 . 819 579 240 1922 . 847 603 244 1923 . 759 620 139 1924 . 842 613 229 1925 . 669 584 85 1926 . 832 611 221 1927 . 875 677 198 1928 . 914 656 258 1929 . 824 617 207 1930 . 887 750 137 1931 . 942 753 189 1932 . 756 719 37 1933 . 552 629 - 77 1934 . 526 655 -129 1935 .. 628 661 - 33 1936 . 630 690 - 60 1937 . : 874 701 173 1938 - 920 714 206 1939 .. 741 664 77 1940 .. 815 676 139 1941 .. 942 668 274 1942 .. 969 . 948 21 1943 .. 844 1,216 -372 1944 . 1,060 987 73 1945 1,108 894 214 1946 . 1,153 769 384 19472 . 1,365 - 764 601 19483 1,284 698 . 586 
1909-41 Average 784 631 171 1909-48 Average 841 677 197 
R e p o r t e d in The Wheat Situation 
'Pre l iminary 
s The amounts processed for foods, used for feed and seed and industrial uses. 
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second in importance (23 percent). Russia was exporting 5 per-cent of the total. In contrast, by 1946-47 the United States was exporting 52 percent and in 1947-48 about 50 percent of the world's total. Russia, during the past two years shows only insignificant exports and Argentina has between 8 and 12 percent of the total 1947-48 international market 1. These major shifts in relative export status suggest that present trading is far out of line with the normal situation. 
From Table 1 it may be observed that in the long run (1909-48), the United States has had an exportable wheat surplus of about 200 million bushels per year. The pre-World War II average was slightly lower, around 170 million bushels. In the long view, it means that the Nation required market outlets for about two hundred million bushels per year. During the last 39 years, from 1909 to 1948, there were only 5 years when domestic consumption exceeded the Nation's production. Two aspects of these data are of particular importance: (1) in the long-run an export market for about 200 million bushels of wheat was needed and, (2) national production during the last five years has exceeded the billion bushel 
Vfheat Production and Domestic Consumption, United S t a t e s , 1909-li8. 
| Amount o f y e a r ' s crop f o r domestic disappearance 
l-t f -I I > I , I I » I j I I I I j I I I I | i I i I t I i i i f i i i » ( i I 
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fore ign Agricultural Circular, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, U.S.D.A., August 31, 1948. 
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Surplus of y e a r ' s crcp above domestic consumption 
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level, which increased the export surplus substantially above the long-time average. 
While no one can ascertain the precise production levels which will prevail in the future, recent technological advances (notably chemical weed control and improved varieties) suggest continued higher levels than pre-war. And, since domestic disappearance for direct human consumption and seed remains fairly stable the fol-lowing alternatives for disposing of our wheat crop suggest them-selves: (1) securing a larger share in the world market, (2) pro-duction controls, (3) expansion of industrial uses of wheat and, (4) increasing the use of wheat as a livestock feed. The emphasis is likely to fall on the first alternative—that of larger exports. 
The Proposal 
In the International Wheat Agreement, export countries are emphasizing the need for a more secure position in the export market. Importing countries need some assurance that they will be able to get this staple food in dependable quantities at reasonable prices. For an assured minimum supply the importing countries would take a chance that the proposed price schedules would not be far out of line, over a period of years, with the so-called "free-market" prices they would have to pay otherwise. Exporting coun-tries likewise would relinquish the possibility of obtaining in some years prices higher than those agreed upon, in exchange for a secured market outlet for a certain amount of export wheat.- For any export above the quota assigned to each exporting country under the Agreement, the world market price would be received. Over a period of years, it is believed by proponents of the plan that the years when the world wheat price is above the ceiling of $2.00 will be just about compensated by years when the world price is below the floor of $1.50 to $1.10. Within the range of these floors and ceilings, supply and demand would determine the price at which the quota wheat would be traded. All members were to be free to bargain, one with the other, within the limits of the ceiling and floor. Prices could vary from 50 to 90 cents per bushel under this arrangement, depending upon the year in question. 
It also should be pointed out that the Agreement does not conflict with our price support program. If the support price was higher than the ceiling price under the Agreement, the Government would buy wheat up to our export quota at support prices and sell it under the terms of the Agreement as a regular part of its price support program. 
Opposition to the Plan 
During the hearings conducted by a sub-committee of' the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations the proposal was sup-ported by the main farm organizations and opposed primarily by the grain trade and milling interests. In general the opposition arises from a desire to keep the Government out of economic affairs as much as possible. Most people would support this aim. One point to remember however, is that the export quota transactions 
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would be one means of sustaining the domestic agricultural sup-port program. The Government would have had a guaranteed price of $1.10 to $2.00 per bushel, depending upon the year in question and the general economic conditions. Furthermore, the absence of any general agreement has already stimulated an upsurge in bilateral trading. World recovery requires a much broader framework of cooperation. 
But there are other considerations. In the first place Ar-gentina's position is indeterminate. As was pointed out earlier, Argentina exported about 23 percent of the total world exports of bread grains during the years 1934-38. Today she supplies about 12 percent of the total. In the long-run she may hold as much as one-quarter of the market. The question is therefore: could Argentina through reduced prices lure members to the Agreement away from their contracts? The same question applies to the position of Russia. It is the age-old problem of making coopera-tive efforts succeed where non-cooperators are competing for markets. 
Whether the Agreement would have had a strong effect on the world price is difficult to determine. To begin with the fifty-to ninety-cent margin was provided, for bargaining purposes. As long as the free market price fell in this 'range the Agreement would not affect wheat prices. In periods of short supply the cffect would be to keep prices in the general market from rising as far above the ceiling as would otherwise be the case. Similarly the effect of large world stocks on price declines would be miti-gated to some extent. The extent to which the Agreement would interfere with open market price determination therefore depends upon the relation of supply and demand to the f if ty to ninety-cent margin provided in the Agreement. 
Secretary Brannan's Comments 
On July 9, 1948, Secretary Brannan issued a significant state-ment on the failure of the United States to ratify the International Wheat Agreement. He said in part: "The International Wheat Agreement, if put into effect, would have guaranteed us a market in the participating countries of 185 million bushels of wheat during each of the next five years at a fair ex-port price. This, in addition to our exports to occupied zones and other non-partici-pating areas, would have provided as large an export market as we would expect to need. Without the Agreement the future of our foreign market is uncertain. Thus we are now faced, for example, with the question of whether we can continue our present high level of wheat production or reduce the wheat production goal for next year". 
He concludes with the following warning: "We shall do what we can to salvage the wreckage. But unquestionably this will be in an atmosphere less favorable than the one in which the present Agreement was negotiated. Without the cooperation of 
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all who are truly concerned with the future welfare of American agriculture, however, it would not be fair to the farmers of the Nation to give them any great encouragement". 
As this goes to press we are informed that a new pact has been drawn up. If this is ratified by all nations framing the new agree-ment, 42 nations will be participants. Newspapers report that under the agreement, 37 nations will take a little over 456 million bushels of wheat a year for four years from five exporting nations. Russia and Argentina however, are not among the exporters. 
The proposed shares of the market involved annually in this agreement are reported to be as follows: 
Canada United States Australia France Uruguay 
Total 456,283,389 bushels 
France and Uruguay have found a place in the new agreement but the maximum price will be $1.80 per bushel or 20 cents lower than the original proposal. The floor price begins at $1.50 per bushel for the first year and decreases by 10 cents for each of the four years to $1.20 per bushel in the final year. If ratified, the agreement will become operative August 1, 1949. 
203,069,635 bushels 168,069,635 " 80,000,000 " 3,306,934 " 1,837,185 " 
